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The COVID-19 pandemic is unlikely to end until there is global rollout of vaccines that 
protect against severe disease, and preferably drive herd immunity. Regulators in 
numerous countries have authorised or approved COVID-19 vaccines for human use, 
with more expected to be licensed in 2021. But having licensed vaccines is not enough 
to achieve global control of COVID-19: they also need to be produced at scale, priced 
affordably, allocated globally so that they are available where needed, and widely 
deployed in local communities. In this article, we review potential challenges to 
achieving each of the pillars and discuss implications for policy. To guide our review, we 
developed a dashboard to highlight key characteristics of 26 leading vaccine candidates, 
including efficacy levels, dosing regimens, storage requirements, prices, production 
capacities in 2021, and stocks reserved for low- and middle-income countries. We use a 
traffic-light system to signal the potential contributions of each candidate to achieving 
global vaccine immunity, highlighting important trade-offs that policymakers need to 
consider when developing and implementing vaccination programmes. While specific 
datapoints and their corresponding traffic-light categorisations are subject to change as 
the pandemic response progresses, the dashboard will continue to provide a useful lens 
through which to analyse the key issues affecting the use of COVID-19 vaccines. We also 
present original data from a 32-country survey (n=26,758) of potential acceptance of 
COVID-19 vaccines; the survey was conducted from October to December 2020. The 
share of respondents who said they would “definitely” or “probably” get vaccinated 
when a COVID-19 vaccine becomes available was highest in Vietnam (98%), followed by 
India and China (both 91%), and Denmark and South Korea (both 87%). The country 
that reported the lowest number of people who would “definitely” or “probably” get 
vaccinated was Serbia (38%), followed by Croatia (41%), France and Lebanon (both 















The COVID-19 pandemic has caused substantial excess mortality1 and plunged national 
economies into deep recessions.2 Although the spread of the virus can be mitigated 
through physical distancing, face coverings, and testing and tracing—and potentially 
with therapeutics—the risk of outbreaks and disruption to economic and social life will 
likely remain until effective vaccines are administered to large portions of the global 
population to prevent hospitalisation and severe disease, and preferably achieve herd 
immunity to halt transmission of the virus. 
 
Several COVID-19 vaccines have now been authorised or approved for human use, with 
many more in late stages of clinical development. Yet having licensed vaccines is not 
enough to achieve global control of COVID-19: they also need to be produced at scale, 
priced affordably, allocated globally so that they are available where needed, and widely 
deployed in local communities (Figure 1). The four pillars of the global vaccination 
challenge are closely related, and the development and production steps have important 
implications for pricing, allocation, and confidence. 
 
In this article, we review potential challenges to achieving each of the pillars and discuss 
implications for policy. To guide our review, we developed a dashboard (Table 1) to 
highlight key characteristics of 26 leading vaccine candidates, based on the target 
product profiles for COVID-19 vaccines set by the World Health Organization (WHO). 
We focused on characteristics which distinguish individual vaccine candidates from one 
another. We use a traffic-light system to signal the potential contributions of each 
candidate to achieving global vaccine immunity, with red indicating there are high risks 
to achieving widespread immunity, amber indicating medium risk, and green meaning 
little or no risk. Appendix 1 outlines the methodology for constructing the dashboard, 
including the criteria for assigning a green, amber, or red light for each characteristic. 
While specific datapoints and their corresponding traffic-light categorisations are 
subject to change as the pandemic response progresses, the dashboard will continue to 










a Stringent regulatory bodies may approve vaccines or authorise their use in emergencies (e.g. emergency use authorisation during public health crises, such as 
pandemics); the World Health Organization may grant vaccines emergency use listing (comparable to emergency use authorisation by a stringent body) or pre-
qualification (comparable to approval by a stringent body). The World Health Organization publishes a list of stringent regulatory authorities.3
6 
 
Table 1. Dashboard of key characteristics for leading vaccine candidates (grouped by pillar), with traffic-light system to signal the potential contributions of each 
candidate to achieving global vaccine immunity (as of February 3, 2021). a 





authority or the 
WHO b 
Efficacy 







% of doses pre-
purchased by 












AnGes / Osaka - - - - - No 2 -70°C 
Anhui Zhifei / CAMS - - 300m - - No 2 or 3 2°C to 8°C 
AstraZeneca / Oxford Yes 62% f 3bn $5 27% Yes 2 2°C to 8°C 
Bharat Biotech No - 700m $6 0% No 2 2°C to 8°C 
Biological E - - - - - No 2 2°C to 8°C 
BioNTech / Pfizer Yes 95% 2bn $14 77% Yes 2 -70°C 
CAMS / IMB - - - - - No 2 2°C to 8°C 
CanSino - - 320m * - 0% No 1 2°C to 8°C 
Clover / Dynavax - - 1bn - - No 2 2°C to 8°C 
Covaxx - - 1bn - 0% No 2 2°C to 8°C 
CureVac - - 300m $24 100% No 2 5°C 
Gamaleya  Yes 92% 1bn $6 0% g No 2 -18°C 
Inovio - - 100m - - No 2 2°C to 8°C 
Johnson & Johnson - 66% h 1bn * $9 38% Yes 1 i 2°C to 8°C 
Medicago - - 80m - 100% No 2 2°C to 8°C 
Moderna Yes 94% 1bn $31 97% No 2 -20°C 
Novavax - 89% h,j 2bn $6 31% Yes 2 2°C to 8°C 
RIBSP No - 60m - - No 2 2°C to 8°C 
Sanofi / GSK - - - $19 73% Yes 2 2°C to 8°C 
SII / Max Planck Inst. - - - - - No - -50°C to -15°C 
Sinopharm / Beijing Inst. Yes 79% h 1bn $62 8% No 2 2°C to 8°C 
Sinopharm / Wuhan Inst. No - 600m $62 8% No 2 2°C to 8°C 
Sinovac  No 50% to 91% h,k 1bn $21 18% No 2 Room temp 
SK Biosciences - - - - - No - 2°C to 8°C 
University of Hong Kong - - - - - No - -50°C to -15°C 















* For the 
assignment of risk 
levels, we treat a 
single dose of a 1-
dose vaccine as 
equivalent to two 














Green: Room temp 
Amber: Cold 
Red: Ultra cold 
 
CAMS= Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences. GSK=GlaxoSmithKline. HIC=high-income country. IMB=Institute of Medical Biology (China). Inst.=Institute. ph.=phase. RIBSP=Research 
Institute for Biological Safety Problems (Kazakhstan). SII=Serum Institute of India. USD=United States dollars. WHO=World Health Organization. 
 
a The sources and methodology are documented in Appendix 1. These candidates shown in this table have been approved or authorised on an emergency basis for human use in one or 
more countries, are in phase 3 clinical testing, or are under contract with the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations or the COVAX Facility (as of February 3, 2021). Dashes 
indicate that either the data are unavailable, or it is too early to know (for vaccines in the earlier stages of development). Institut Pasteur (and its development partner Merck) and the 
University of Queensland were developing COVID-19 vaccine candidates with funding from the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, but these clinical trials have been 
discontinued. 
b Only for vaccines which have been approved or granted emergency authorisation by at least one regulatory body. The WHO publishes a list of stringent regulatory authorities.3 The WHO 
may grant vaccines emergency use listing or pre-qualification. 
c Clinical trial designs, including efficacy endpoints, differed for the various vaccine candidates. Some of these efficacy figures may therefore not be perfectly comparable. Due to the 
emergence of new variants of the virus, the conditions under which trials take place vary; not all vaccines are tested against the same variants. 
d These are the lowest price the developers offered to any country or purchasing bloc. Median prices for a range of countries are presented in Figure 2. 
e Formally, the COVAX Facility also has a “first right of refusal for a potential combined total of over 1 billion doses in 2021” of vaccine candidates being developed by the companies 
funded by the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations: Biological E, Clover, CureVac, Inovio, Moderna, Novavax, Oxford/AstraZeneca, SK Biosciences, and University of Hong 
Kong.4 
f This was the result in the main efficacy analysis for participants receiving two standard doses, as specified in the protocol. The result in the out-of-protocol arm (half dose followed by 
standard dose) was 90%. 
g One high-income country (Hungary) has purchased 2m doses, corresponding to 0.4% of all purchased doses. Due to rounding, the figure presented in the dashboard is 0%. 
h These interim phase 3 results have not been published in peer-reviewed journals. The figures were sourced from press releases by companies or researchers running the clinical trials. 
i The developer is also testing a two-dose version. 
j This was the efficacy reported from a phase 3 trials in the United Kingdom. Novavax reported a lower efficacy level in a smaller phase 2b clinical trial in South Africa (49%). These results 
have not yet been published in peer-reviewed journals. 
k Sinovac and its research partners have reported a range of efficacy levels based on phase 3 trials conducted in Brazil (50%), Indonesia (65%), Turkey (91%), and the United Arab 




2. Development and production of COVID-19 vaccines 
 
Several manufacturers successfully developed COVID-19 vaccines in under 12 months—
an extraordinary achievement, given it typically takes a decade or longer to develop 
new vaccines.5–8 The world now needs more doses of COVID-19 vaccines than any other 
vaccine in history in order to inoculate enough people to achieve global vaccine 
immunity. 
 
Vaccines often suffer from under-investment,9 but that has not been the case in this 
pandemic. As of February 3, 2021, there were 289 experimental COVID-19 vaccines in 
development, 66 of which were in different phases of clinical testing, including 20 in 
phase 3.10 Only five of these 66 vaccines—those developed by AstraZeneca/Oxford, 
BioNTech/Pfizer, Gamaleya, Moderna, and Sinopharm/Beijing Institute—have been 
authorised by stringent regulatory authorities (as per WHO criteria of such authorities3) 
or the WHO (Table 1). Another five—from China, India, Kazakhstan, and Russia—have 
received approval or been authorised for emergency use by other regulatory agencies; 
some of these firms have submitted documentation to WHO for emergency use listing or 
pre-qualification, but these submissions are still under review.11 Additional vaccines 
from Novavax and Johnson & Johnson are expected to be authorised based on positive 
interim phase 3 results. Several vaccines have demonstrated high levels of efficacy in 
clinical trials (>70%), although not all developers have published their results. 
 
While public support for basic research and early-stage drug development is common,12 
the urgent need to develop COVID-19 vaccines and scale up supply has inspired new 
ways of aiding research, development, and production activities and enlist broad 
participation among private companies.13 Governments and non-profit actors have 
financed clinical trials, invested in the building and expansion of production facilities, 
and established contract manufacturing and distribution networks to enable rapid 
rollout of successful vaccines.14 
 
Table 2 summarises publicly available data on investments by governments and non-
profit actors into the research, development, and production of advanced COVID-19 
vaccine candidates. For more information see Appendix 2. The top five firms have each 
received between $957 million and $2.1 billion in funding commitments, mostly from 
the US government and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI). 
The Chinese and Russian governments have invested in several vaccine candidates 
being developed by private firms or state-owned enterprises. Because many funding 
arrangements are confidential, details regarding the specific breakdown of spending are 
unclear. 
 
Attention has now turned to expanding production capacity to promote widespread 
rollout of successful vaccines, as well as efficiently distributing them to centres for 
administration. Companies with leading candidates have reported widely different 
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supply capabilities through the end of 2021 (Table 1). Nine developers have said they 
will be able to produce at most 700 million doses each this year, while 10 other 
manufacturers have set production targets of 1 billion doses each or more. No single 
company will be able to supply all countries in this period. 
 
Scaling up production to meet global demand is a monumental challenge.15,16 Prior to 
this pandemic, there were no existing networks of contract manufacturers for several of 
the leading vaccine candidates that feature novel technologies, including those relying 
on messenger ribonucleic acid (mRNA) delivery platforms. And the volume of vaccines 
that are needed places pressures on global supply chains for inputs, like glass vials, 
syringes, and stabilising agents.  
 
The production of COVID-19 vaccines is limited by the highly concentrated state of 
global vaccine manufacturing capacity,17 and the relationships established between lead 
developers and contract manufacturers. A successful solution to the production 
bottleneck would likely require widespread technology transfer to enable the expansion 
of manufacturing capacity. Currently, few countries have domestic capacity to rapidly 
produce COVID-19 vaccines on their own, and instead would need firms to actively 
share knowledge, technology, and data with domestic manufacturers.18 Some of the lead 
developers of COVID-19 vaccines have collaboration agreements with manufacturers in 
middle-income countries—for example, AstraZeneca with the Serum Institute (India), 
Fiocruz (Brazil), mAbxience Buenos Aires (Argentina), and Siam Bioscience (Thailand); 
Johnson & Johnson with Aspen (South Africa); and Novavax with the Serum Institute 
(India)—although the terms of these partnerships, including the extent to which the 
licensed manufacturers can negotiate their own supply arrangements with countries, 




Table 2. Public and non-profit funding for the research, development, and production of leading vaccine candidates (as of February 3, 2021). a  
Lead developers Technology 
Known public and non-
profit funding, US$ 
Funders 
Sanofi / GSK Protein subunit $2.1 billion US Govt 
Novavax Protein subunit $2.1 billion CEPI / Gates Foundation / US Govt 
AstraZeneca / Oxford Non-replicating viral vector $1.7 billion CEPI / UK Govt / US Govt 
Johnson & Johnson Non-replicating viral vector $1.5 billion US Govt 
Moderna mRNA $957 million CEPI / Dolly Parton COVID-19 Research Fund / US Govt 
BioNTech / Pfizer mRNA $445 million German Govt 
Clover / Dynavax Protein subunit $430 million CEPI / Gates Foundation 
CureVac mRNA $348 million CEPI / German Govt 
Sinopharm / Wuhan Inst. Inactivated $142 million Chinese Govt 
Medicago Virus-like particle $137 million Canadian Govt 
Inovio DNA $107 million CEPI / Gates Foundation / US Govt 
Covaxx Protein subunit $15 million Taiwanese Govt 
SK Biosciences Protein subunit $14 million CEPI / Gates Foundation 
Biological E Protein subunit $9 million CEPI / Gates Foundation / Indian Govt 
University of Hong Kong Replicating viral vector $4 million CEPI / Hong Kong Govt 
CAMS / IMB Inactivated $3 million Chinese Govt / Jack Ma Foundation 
AnGes / Osaka DNA Unknown Japanese Govt 
Anhui Zhifei / CAMS Protein subunit Unknown Chinese Govt 
Bharat Biotech Inactivated Unknown Indian Govt 
CanSino Non-replicating viral vector Unknown Unknown 
Gamaleya Non-replicating viral vector Unknown Russian Govt 
RIBSP Inactivated Unknown Kazakh Govt 
SII / Max Planck Inst. Live attenuated Unknown Unknown 
Sinopharm / Beijing Inst. Inactivated Unknown Chinese Govt 
Sinovac Inactivated Unknown Chinese Govt 
Vector Inst. Protein subunit Unknown Russian Govt 
CAMS=Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences. CEPI=Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovation. DNA=deoxyribonucleic acid. Govt=government. GSK=GlaxoSmithKline. 




a The sources and methodology are outlined in Appendix 2, which also includes more information about the funding arrangements. In brief, for companies with COVID-19 
vaccines which have been approved or authorised for human use in one or more countries, are in phase 3 clinical testing, or are under contract with the Coalition for Epidemic 
Preparedness Innovations or the COVAX Facility, we searched press releases from companies and funders, as well as financial reports filed by companies with regulators in 
various countries, for information on public and non-profit funding. We did not count funds provided to licensees that produce and distribute vaccines on behalf of lead 
developers or to contract development and manufacturing organisations, nor did we count loans (i.e., debt financing) from international financial institutions (e.g., European 
Investment Bank). We included pre-purchase agreements between governments and companies where it appeared as though a significant portion of the funding went towards 
late-stage development (i.e., phase 1-3 trials) or scaling up production at risk prior to the completion of clinical testing. 
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3. Affordability of COVID-19 vaccines 
 
Mechanisms are needed to ensure the affordability and sustainable financing of COVID-
19 vaccines in low- and middle-income countries, which are home to about 85% of the 
global population and may lack resources to buy adequate quantities of vaccines.19,20 
Even in high-income countries, it is important to ensure access to COVID-19 vaccines for 




Firms have gradually been disclosing the prices they are offering to countries of 
different income levels, with marked variation in the lowest price per course (Table 1). 
Some firms, like AstraZeneca and Johnson & Johnson, which are benefiting heavily from 
public-sector investments, have pledged to sell their vaccines globally at low prices. 
Both firms have committed to maintaining these prices “during the pandemic”,21,22 
although more clarity is needed to understand how it will be determined that the 
pandemic is over, as well as post-pandemic pricing models. These factors have 
implications for the durability of vaccination campaigns, especially if annual boosters 
will be required. Other companies are charging considerably more, with some firms 
setting prices that are among the highest of any in existence for vaccines (Figure 2). 
Some manufacturers are also planning to sell COVID-19 vaccines at a premium in 
private markets in countries like Bangladesh, Brazil, and India.23–25 There are concerns 
that wealthier patients in these countries may gain quicker access to vaccines through 
these markets. 
 
Multiple factors may drive the observed variation in prices. These include, for example, 
differences in technological platforms and the associated development and 
manufacturing costs; the amount of public funding that developers received; companies’ 
diverse approaches toward licensing and the establishment of production networks; the 
extent to which COVID-19 vaccines fit into pharmaceutical firms’ overall profit-making 
strategies; the presence of intellectual property rights; funders’ demands (e.g., CEPI’s 
access conditions); as well as political pressures on companies to keep prices low. 
 
To illustrate how the prices of COVID-19 vaccines compare to those of other vaccines, 
Figure 2 shows the median price per dose of existing vaccines by procurement or 
income group as of the end of 2018. Generally, countries covered by Gavi, a major buyer 
of vaccines for low-income countries, paid the lowest prices per dose (median across all 
vaccines, $0.57; interquartile range [IQR], $0.16-$1.9), followed by countries covered by 
UNICEF (median $0.80; IQR, $0.16-$2.8) and Pan American Health Organization 
(median $3.5, IQR, $0.87-$13.0), self-procuring middle-income countries (median, $5.3; 
IQR, $0.79-$18.3), and self-procuring high-income countries (median, $16.3; IQR, $6.5-
$22.0).26 Many self-procuring middle-income countries, which receive limited external 
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assistance, have historically been charged vaccine prices that are largely unrelated to 
income levels.27 
 
Vaccine prices are especially important in the case of COVID-19, on account of the 
volumes demanded. Countries are aiming to administer COVID-19 vaccines to nearly 
their entire populations, potentially making these unaffordable for many governments, 
even at low per-dose prices. Depending on the duration of protection offered by these 
vaccines, as well as the potential need for modified vaccines that protect against new 
variants, these purchases could become recurring expenses. 
 
Sustainable funding  
 
To fund COVID-19 vaccines and vaccination programmes, including the costs of 
distribution, administration, record-keeping, and surveillance, governments will need 
substantial national revenue generation or external aid. Experiences with mass drug 
administration in previous health crises, for example HIV/AIDS, have shown that even 
when pharmaceutical products are inexpensive, or free, countries need financial 
support to both purchase and deploy them.28,29  
 
These financial pressures are coming at a time when many economies are in crisis due 
the pandemic. If governments in resource-constrained settings divert resources from 
other vaccination programmes or essential health-care services to pay for COVID-19 
vaccines and vaccination programmes, this could distort health budgets and have long-
term adverse consequences for health and economic development. 
 
Major donors and lenders, like the World Bank and other multilateral development 
banks, have earmarked billions of dollars in funds for COVID-19 vaccination 
programmes in low- and middle-income countries.30,31 These funds can be used to buy 
vaccines which have been authorised by stringent regulatory bodies or the WHO. The 
G20’s Debt Service Suspension Initiative may provide additional fiscal space too, by 
allowing the world’s poorest countries to spread repayment of debt owed to other 
countries over extended periods of time. Though this initiative does not address debt 
owed to private creditors, the hope is that the temporary suspension of some 
repayments could release resources for more countries to better meet the costs of 
obtaining and administering vaccines.32   
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Figure 2. Median price per dose (US$) for all existing vaccines (2018) and for leading 
COVID-19 vaccine candidates (as of February 3, 2021) by procurement or country 
income group. a 
 
 
GSK=GlaxoSmithKline. HIC=high-income country. J&J=Johnson & Johnson. MIC=middle-income country. 




a Data obtained from the World Health Organization Global Vaccine Market Report.26 Prices were not 
available for all procurement or income groups for all vaccines. Appendix 1 outlines the sources for all 
COVID-19 vaccine prices, which were obtained from press releases, investor documents, and media 
reports. The prices reported in this figure for COVID-19 vaccines are medians prices for each country 
group. These prices may therefore not match those reported in Table 2, which show the lowest price 
offered. 
b Sinopharm is charging the same price for both of its vaccine candidates.   
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4. Global allocation of COVID-19 vaccines 
 
In addition to needing vaccines to exist and to be affordable, a critically important pillar 
of the vaccination challenge is ensuring that enough doses are available globally. 
Current decisions regarding allocation are being made in the context of constrained 
supply, with demand exceeding current and projected levels of output.17,33 Scarce 
supply, coupled with the large volumes of pre-orders made by high- and middle-income 
countries, creates challenges to achieving timely, universal access. Billions of individuals 
around the world may not have access to COVID-19 vaccines in 2021, which could 
prolong the pandemic and raise the risk of further mutations of the virus emerging, 
possibly undermining the efficacy of existing vaccines. 
 
COVAX approach to global allocation 
 
Uneven access to vaccines would not be unprecedented. During the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic, rich countries bought up most of the global supply of pandemic influenza 
vaccines, leaving inadequate amounts for resource-poor countries, many of which were 
among the world’s worst affected.34,35  Some countries went as far as to block locally 
manufactured vaccine doses from being exported elsewhere,36 something which EU 
member states are considering doing in the present pandemic too. 
 
To avoid a repeat of the H1N1 scenario, in April 2020 the WHO announced the creation 
of a global allocation mechanism, the COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access (COVAX) Facility, 
coordinated jointly with CEPI and Gavi. COVAX is a pooled procurement initiative that, 
in addition to seeking to secure low prices, aims to provide all countries with access to a 
diversified portfolio of vaccines during the acute phase of the pandemic in 2021. Richer, 
self-financing countries can purchase vaccines from COVAX at an estimated average 
price of $11 per dose, while 92 poorer countries can receive them at considerably lower 
prices ($1.6 to $2 per dose), subsidised through official development assistance.37 
 
At the core of the COVAX approach to global allocation is that vaccination should 
proceed in stages, with priority given to protecting older adults, health-care workers, 
and other high-risk individuals, before proceeding to vaccinate wider swaths of the 
population.38 According to the COVAX model, all participating countries would initially 
receive enough stock for 20% of their populations, after which distribution would 
adhere to the WHO framework for allocating COVID-19 vaccines internationally based 
on need.38 The over-arching logic of COVAX is that no country should vaccinate more 
than 20% of its population until all countries have vaccinated 20%, in accordance with 
principles of global equality. Others have suggested alternative allocation frameworks, 
though all share their roots in principles of fairness and ethics.39–43  
 




For COVAX to succeed, it needs substantial funding to purchase vaccines. As of February 
2021, governments and other partners have committed around $4.0 billion in funding 
for COVAX,44  but Gavi and the WHO estimate that a further $6.8 billon will be needed 
for COVAX to procure and deliver at least 2 billion doses by the end of 2021.4,45 
 
A greater threat to equitable allocation comes from national procurement strategies 
that may leave COVAX with inadequate supply.46–52 Many high-income countries have 
opted not to purchase their vaccines via COVAX, and instead have sought to gain 
priority access to abundant quantities of COVID-19 vaccines by striking advance 
purchase agreements with developers. The goal of such purchases is to secure access to 
enough vaccine to inoculate most, if not all, of countries’ adult populations in 2021. 
Securing large quantities of vaccines in this way amounts to countries placing 
widespread inoculation of their own populations ahead of the vaccination of health-care 
workers and high-risk populations in poorer countries. Based on public records, 
governments in high-income countries—representing 16% of the global population53—
have struck pre-orders covering at least 4.2 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines. These 
countries have secured at least 70% of doses available in 2021 of five leading vaccine 
candidates, based on known deals (Table 1). 
 
Though the pattern of purchasing vaccines directly from developers and not via COVAX 
began with high-income countries (including the EU as a unified buyer), numerous 
other countries have followed suit. This dynamic is self-reinforcing: as more countries 
procure doses directly, concerns about the reliability of COVAX’s supply heighten, thus 
creating greater incentives for countries to procure doses on their own. The incentives 
to procure vaccines this way increases further after positive trial results are announced, 
which reduces the risk of advanced purchases for the successful vaccines. As of 
February 3, 2021, at least 62 countries or blocs of countries had signed purchase 
agreements with manufacturers.54 
 
But not all countries can procure enough COVID-19 vaccines on their own. Instead, most 
countries are counting on COVAX, which has reached agreements with five companies 
(Table 1) for about 2 billion doses.4 This amount could allow COVAX to achieve the goal 
of vaccinating 20% of the populations of participating countries. However, because it is 
unclear which vaccines will be distributed to which countries at what time, it is 
challenging for governments reliant on COVAX for doses to plan vaccination 
programmes. Similarly, uncertainty about COVAX supply complicates governments’ 
decisions about how to acquire the best vaccine portfolios for their populations, 
including doses beyond those covered by COVAX. 
 
Apart from the cross-country equity concerns raised by a scenario of 20% vaccination 
starting later in 2021 in poorer countries next to much wider (if not universal) 
vaccination starting and advancing earlier in richer countries, there is uncertainty about 
the supply earmarked for COVAX. Many of the doses secured by COVAX are of vaccines 
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that, as of February 2021, are just completing clinical trials and may not be available for 
months to come.4 COVAX may also gain access to vaccines being developed by 
companies funded by CEPI that are not as far along in trials, and it may negotiate further 
agreements with other suppliers. Yet overall, COVAX’s supply is precarious and depends 
on what happens to the vaccines in clinical trials, how much of the successful ones can 
be produced quickly, and how much of the output is left for COVAX after sales to 
national governments. 
 
Though COVAX was originally created to achieve equality in the initial stages of 
vaccination, as all countries inoculate the first 20% of their populations, it is unlikely to 
achieve that goal. Instead, what COVAX can achieve, hopefully, is help countries procure 
doses at lower prices and thus launch their vaccination campaigns earlier than they 
would if left on their own. With additional funding, COVAX could likely compete better 
in the global scramble for vaccines and secure a place further toward the front of the 
queue. 
 
Given scarce supply of some of the vaccines developed in Europe and the US (Table 1), 
governments in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia have turned 
increasingly toward vaccines developed by Chinese, Indian, and Russian 
manufacturers.55,56 These vaccines, which are far along in the development process, may 
relax the global supply constraint. To the extent that high-income countries continue to 
refrain from purchasing these products, their emergence may allow poorer countries to 
also procure abundant doses to achieve national vaccination goals. Though few have 
been authorised by the WHO or by regulatory authorities that the WHO classifies as 





5. Deployment of COVID-19 vaccines  
 
Beyond issues related to determining which countries will get vaccine doses when, and 
at what prices, it is essential to ensure the smooth deployment of COVID-19 vaccines. 
The rapid pace of production and development has shortened the time available for 
national, regional, and local health officials to plan training and preparedness for 
COVID-19 vaccination programmes. 
 
Logistical and administrative challenges 
 
Robust data infrastructure will be needed for local authorities to identify eligible 
individuals by priority group, send invitations, arrange transport for disabled and 
elderly patients, and (for some vaccines) recall individuals for their second doses. 
Several of the leading vaccine candidates require ultra-cold chains and have short shelf 
lives once they are removed from storage. BioNTech/Pfizer’s vaccine, for instance, must 
be administered within 5 days of leaving ultra-low temperature conditions (-70°C);57 
similar, if less extreme, requirements apply to Moderna’s mRNA vaccine. Strong 
coordination between workers at central depots and local vaccinators will be needed to 
ensure the timely and efficient distribution of batches to areas without freezers so doses 
of mRNA vaccines can be administered promptly. 
 
Many low- and middle-income countries will face barriers in delivering vaccination 
programmes to adults, ensuring completion of two-dose vaccination schedules, and 
maintaining cold or ultra-cold supply chains. As of 2018, 74 of the 194 WHO member 
states had no adult vaccination programme for any disease, such as seasonal influenza; 
fewer than 11% of countries in Africa and South Asia reported having any such 
programme.58 These countries may lack immunisation registries for adults and the 
storage, delivery, and waste management systems needed to administer vaccines at this 
scale.58 It is worth noting that Gavi and its partners established ultra-cold supply chains 
in several sub-Saharan African countries after the 2013-2014 Ebola epidemic to deploy 
an Ebola vaccine developed by Merck which must be kept at -60°C to -80°C. However, 
this was done on a much smaller scale than what is currently needed, and would be 
prohibitively expensive for the global administration of vaccines in this pandemic.59,60 
 
Several vaccines which only require refrigeration during transport have been 
authorised for human use, while a few single-dose products are in clinical development 
(Table 1). The availability of one-dose vaccines which can be kept refrigerated or at 
room temperature would greatly simplify the logistical and administrative challenges 
associated with COVID-19 vaccination programmes. Moreover, as scientific 
understanding of the properties of new vaccines (such as the thermal stability of mRNA 
vaccines) improves—or new ways of formulating these vaccines are developed—it is 
possible that logistical barriers may be lowered; this would make it easier to deploy 
such vaccines in resource-poor countries. Indeed, CureVac has an experimental mRNA 
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vaccine in late-stage clinical development which can be kept refrigerated. The product 
profiles of COVID-19 vaccines can help governments decide which vaccines to procure; 
these profiles, alongside any constraints reported by governments, can also help inform 
COVAX’s allocation decisions. This may become increasingly important as additional, 
differentiated vaccines are authorised.  
 
Beyond technical issues related to data and storage infrastructures, vaccination 
schedules, and other logistical matters, there are steps that governments can take to 
promote accountability, which may make COVID-19 vaccination campaigns more 
effective. These include, for example, transparency and clear communication on the part 
of government officials about timelines, the prioritisation of different groups for 
vaccination, the choice of vaccine products, and the design of administration schedules. 
This may require country-level monitoring and evaluation systems to track vaccine roll-
out. This can help support the efficient running of campaigns, as well as continued 
population adherence to non-pharmaceutical interventions, like physical distancing and 




Deployment can also be hampered by vaccine hesitancy,61–71 which may lead to delayed 
acceptance or refusal of COVID-19 vaccines. Hesitancy is prevalent in poor and rich 
countries alike, with sceptics found in all socioeconomic, religious, and ethnic groups.  
  
Figure 3 presents original data from a 32-country survey (n=26,758) of potential 
acceptance of COVID-19 vaccines conducted between October 21, 2020, and December 
16, 2020. The share of respondents who said they would “definitely” or “probably” get 
vaccinated when a COVID-19 vaccine becomes available was highest in Vietnam (98%), 
followed by India and China (both 91%), and Denmark and South Korea (both 87%). 
The country that reported the lowest number of people who would “definitely” or 
“probably” get vaccinated was Serbia (38%), followed by Croatia (41%), France and 
Lebanon (both 44%), and Paraguay (51%). 
 
Numerous other surveys of COVID-19 vaccine acceptance were conducted between 
March and October 2020.72–76 While it is not possible to directly compare the results of 
all existing surveys of COVID-19 vaccine acceptance, due to differences in the countries 
included, questionnaires, and methodologies, these surveys overall seem to suggest that 
willingness to vaccinate against COVID-19 has declined globally between the early 
months of the pandemic and December, although rates tend to fluctuate. 
 
At least three issues are contributing to COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy. First, the speed at 
which vaccines have been developed, which reflects the unprecedented amount of 
funding from governments and non-profit groups, has raised concerns that they were 
rushed and regulatory standards relaxed,77 concerns that were similarly reported 
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during the H1N1 pandemic.78 Second, there are no previously approved mRNA vaccines, 
which also sparks hesitancy given the newness of these approaches. Third, conspiracy 
theories about COVID-19 vaccines are being widely circulated on unregulated social 
media platforms,79–81 sometimes by highly organised anti-vaccination groups.82–84 
  
The evidence to support measures to mitigate vaccine hesitancy and refusal is mixed, in 
part due to the wide range of strategies which have been used across settings for 
different vaccines and target groups.85 Common elements across successful strategies 
include: (1) initiatives to increase vaccination knowledge and awareness; (2) 
community engagement, including involvement of religious and other influential 
leaders, to understand concerns, build trust, and manage rumours and misinformation; 
and (3) making vaccines available in convenient and accessible locations.67,86–88 Having 
robust pharmacovigilance systems, alongside compensation schemes for severe adverse 
events, may help build confidence in vaccine safety in post-approval periods, especially 
in resource-poor countries with imperfect consumer protection systems.89,90 Moreover, 
disadvantaged groups, many of which have suffered historical neglect and abuse,91 often 
report lower levels of trust in the medical community92,93 and lower uptake of health 
care interventions, including vaccines.94–97 Additional efforts are needed to build trust 
among these groups. 
 
Vaccine confidence may also be strengthened as more manufacturers obtain 
authorisation from stringent regulatory authorities or WHO, and as these bodies clearly 
communicate the rationale behind their decisions to the public. The approval of 
experimental COVID-19 vaccines by Chinese, Indian, and Russian regulators prior to the 
conduct of phase 3 trials has generated widespread consternation among regulators 
and scientists in some other countries because of the limited availability of safety and 
efficacy data and concerns that it could weaken confidence in vaccines.56,98–102 The 
European Medicines Agency has also been subject to lobbying from several EU 
governments, who have urged the regulator to grant authorisation for the 
AstraZeneca/Oxford vaccine as soon as possible to expedite vaccination programmes.103 
Authorisations that are perceived to be premature may undermine trust in regulators, 









UK=United Kingdom. USA=United States of America. 
 
a The data were jointly collected by the polling company ORB International and the Vaccine Confidence 
Project (London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine) between October 21, 2020, and December 16, 
2020. Appendix 3 describes the survey methodology. The data were collected through telephone, online, 
and face-to-face interviewing, depending on the country; participants were recruited and verified locally. 
The agencies did not collect any personally identifiable data. Within each country, the sample ranged 
from 500 respondents (e.g., Lebanon) to 1,500 respondents (e.g., South Korea); 26,758 individuals 
participated in the survey. Samples were random and nationally representative of the adult population in 
30 of the 32 countries. In Ecuador and Vietnam, interviews were only administered in the main cities 
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(Quito and Guayaquil, Ecuador; Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam). Each respondent was asked, in the 
local language: “When a vaccine for the coronavirus becomes available, will you get vaccinated?” The 
possible responses were “definitely will”, “unsure but probably will”, “unsure but probably will not”, or 
“definitely will not”. In this figure, the category “will not get vaccinated” included respondents who said 
they “definitely will not” or “probably will not” get vaccinated. The category “will get vaccinated” included 
respondents who said they “definitely will” or “probably will” get vaccinated. Survey weights were 







Many commentators have called for a cooperative approach to vaccine allocation and 
deployment.48,49 In doing so, appeals to norms of fairness and solidarity are common.48 
By contrast, the widespread disregard for a global approach to vaccine allocation 
demonstrated by national governments is a missed opportunity to maximise the 
common good by reducing the global death toll,104 supporting widespread economic 
recovery,105 and mitigating supply chain disruptions.49 More equitable distribution of 
COVID-19 vaccines would help contain the pandemic sooner, and thus minimise the risk 
of new variants of the virus arising against which existing vaccines are less effective.  
 
In this paper we have stressed the interactions among four pillars involved in the global 
COVID-19 vaccination challenge: development and production, affordability, allocation, 
and deployment. It is not enough to have new vaccines developed; they must be 
affordable, accessible, trusted, and, to maximise impact, utilised. 
 
Governments and other vaccine purchasers must now decide which vaccines to procure, 
as well as how to secure funding for COVID-19 vaccines and vaccination programmes. 
To reach these decisions, government officials and partners in international 
organisations will need to assess the suitability of various vaccines for their respective 
health systems and populations—for example, in terms of availability, affordability, 
efficacy, and dosing and storage requirements.  
 
The dashboard (Table 1) highlights trade-offs associated with leading COVID-19 
vaccines with respect to these pillars. Multiple vaccines, for instance, are highly 
efficacious—exceeding the WHO’s targets of 50% (minimum) and 70% (preferrable) 
efficacy—but require ultra-cold storage during transport or have little reserved 
capacity for low- and middle-income countries. And, while all currently authorised or 
approved vaccines require two doses, single-dose vaccines which can be stored at 
refrigerated temperatures are in late stages of clinical development; such vaccines 
would be easier to deploy in resource-constrained settings, which may lack 
infrastructure for delivering and administering two-dose vaccines reliably. 
 
Differences in product characteristics may become particularly salient in 2021, while 
vaccines remain in short supply. If additional vaccines are successful in clinical testing 
and companies meet their production targets, then COVAX could allocate vaccines, in 
part, based on their suitability for local conditions. For instance, should single-dose 
vaccines which can be stored in refrigerators become available, then these could be 
prioritised for distribution in low- and middle-income countries that lack ultra-cold 
supply chains or national vaccine registries for two-dose regimens. 
 
The dynamics of production and development have important implications for each of 
the other pillars. Governments and non-profit groups have committed unprecedented 
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sums towards the development of COVID-19 vaccines and the infrastructure to produce 
them at scale, which has helped companies develop new vaccines in record time. But 
affordability remains a concern, given the volume of doses that countries will need to 
purchase, and the additional expenditures that distributing and delivering vaccines 
entails. The extensive involvement of public funders in the development and production 
of COVID-19 vaccines provides them with opportunities to make these vaccines globally 
affordable. For vaccines developed by companies accepting external investment, 
funders that are sharing the financial risks could try to exercise leverage over the 
pricing of these products, as CEPI has aimed to do (with uncertain levels of 
success).106,107 Funders could also negotiate clear timelines for the recovery of research, 
development, and production costs by companies; for example, initial doses might be 
sold at higher prices in the first year in rich countries and then closer to marginal cost in 
subsequent years.108 Determining these price levels would require governments to 
audit the financial records of vaccine makers. 
 
The allocation challenges discussed are also related to production: conflicts over 
priority access to scarce vaccine doses could be made less acute with greater output 
(i.e., were vaccine doses less scarce). To that end, the WHO has called for member states, 
manufacturers, and other organisations to commit to sharing knowledge, intellectual 
property, and data related to COVID-19 health technologies, through the COVID-19 
Technology Access Pool (C-TAP). Similarly, several countries have proposed to suspend 
the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) rules on intellectual property rights during the 
pandemic, suggesting that doing so could facilitate scaling-up. Yet as of February 2021, 
no manufacturers of leading vaccine candidates have engaged with C-TAP, and the WTO 
reform proposal has not gained traction. 
 
Here too, the extensive public role in funding vaccine development potentially provides 
opportunities. Funders could encourage vaccine developers receiving public support to 
share their technologies and know-how systematically and widely, so to expand global 
production. And funders could work with developers to alleviate supply chain 
constraints and accelerate the scaling up of production. To the extent that international 
control of COVID-19 is regarded as a global priority, for example to slow the emergence 
of new, dangerous variants (against which some authorised vaccines may be less 
effective), governments may have an incentive to exercise these levers. 
 
As important as developing and distributing safe, efficacious, and affordable vaccines 
around the world is the needed public confidence and trust in COVID-19 vaccines and 
those who deliver them to ensure uptake. Policy makers should urgently engage with 
communities to improve confidence in vaccines and combat misinformation and 
rumours around COVID-19. Post-marketing surveillance is important to build 
confidence during vaccine rollout. Developing successful, locally tailored strategies 





Equally, vaccine manufacturers should aim for maximum transparency and scrutiny of 
their clinical trial data to build public trust. It is in the interest of manufacturers and the 
public for preliminary data to be assessed by stringent regulatory bodies before these 
data are publicly released. Regulatory bodies safeguard public health by assessing 
whether the benefits of pharmaceuticals outweigh their risks. Regulatory decisions and 
their rationale should be clearly communicated to provide reassurance to the public 
that authorised products are safe and efficacious. Vaccine developers have a further 
reason for seeking approval or emergency use authorisation from a stringent regulatory 
body or WHO: only vaccines which have gone through one of these regulatory pathways 








The societal value of safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines is enormous. Yet new 
vaccines will mean little to individuals around the world if they are unable to get 
vaccinated in a timely manner. This requires vaccines to be affordable and available to 
countries around the world, and for governments to have the administrative and 
political capacities to deliver them locally. In this paper we have discussed each of these 
four dimensions: production and development, affordability, allocation, and 
deployment; and the interactions between them. The distinct characteristics of leading 
COVID-19 vaccines across each of these dimensions generates trade-offs, which mean 
that both globally and nationally, the availability of diversified sets of vaccine options is 
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